From "threat" to nuclear temptation: What problems does the new Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi raise?

The newly appointed Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, who took office less than a month ago, has already plunged Japanese regional diplomacy into chaos, reopened old wounds in Asia, and alarmed observers with her program, which revives dangerous tendencies from Japan's modern political history.

Her latest provocation – linking Taiwan to a fabricated "survival crisis" for Japan – raises troubling questions about the direction Japan intends to take.

The concept of a "survival crisis" is not new. It was first introduced a decade ago by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who pushed through a controversial security reform to circumvent Japan's post-war pacifist constitution. Under this framework, Japan could invoke the right to collective self-defense if a country "closely linked to Japan" were attacked, even without a direct attack on Japanese territory.

Takaichi, who openly presents herself as Abe's political heir, has taken this narrative even further. During a parliamentary session on November 7th, she suggested that a "Taiwan scenario" could trigger a Japanese "survival crisis," implying the possibility of Japanese military intervention in the Taiwan issue.

This argument is not only legally untenable but also historically absurd. Taiwan is not a "foreign country closely linked to Japan," and the Taiwan issue does not threaten the "lives, freedom, or happiness" of Japanese citizens. Historian Ukeru Magosaki clearly pointed out: "Taiwan is part of China; how could it represent a Japanese 'survival crisis'?"

Analysts warn that this is a pattern of dangerous rhetoric. Every major instance of Japanese militaristic expansion in the first half of the 20th century was accompanied by similar narratives of "survival crises," from the fabricated September 18 Incident in 1931 to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. These narratives paved the way for invasions of neighboring countries and caused immense suffering throughout Asia. Takaichi's revival of this rhetoric is a warning sign.

Her provocative statements about Taiwan are not an isolated incident. Just days after taking office, she posted photos on social media of meetings with Taiwanese officials during an APEC meeting, violating Japan's commitment to the principle of one China. In response, Beijing strongly protested.

Her administration also awarded the Order of the Rising Sun to Hsieh Chang-ting, a well-known Taiwanese separatist, on November 3rd. Throughout his long political career, he has repeatedly taken confrontational positions, denied the Nanjing Massacre, and visited the Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 convicted war criminals from World War II are enshrined.

However, the most serious aspect of Takaichi's rhetoric is its broader militaristic agenda. She advocates for a significant increase in defense spending, a relaxation of restrictions on arms exports, and an expansion of Japan's offensive military capabilities. Kyodo News reports that she is even considering changing the "three non-nuclear principles," which have long prohibited Japan from possessing, manufacturing, or hosting nuclear weapons. Such a change could allow for the deployment of U.S. nuclear assets in Japan and would represent a fundamental departure from decades of post-war policy.

Wu Jinan, former president of the Shanghai Association of Japanese Studies, believes that Takaichi was overly confident during her initial political "honeymoon" period, and her statements gave the impression that she could act without restraint. However, criticism of her is growing. Some Tokyo experts consider her approach to the United States to be "subservient," while the cancellation of promised subsidies and the violation of electoral commitments signal an excessive boldness that could alienate both domestic and regional partners. Wu warns that Takaichi is crossing political and diplomatic boundaries that no Japanese prime minister has ever crossed since the war. Her statements ignore the Japanese constitution, the consensus on the principle of "one China," and the four political documents that govern Sino-Japanese relations. This provocative policy could lead to a situation of "high risk and low reward" – initial boldness in taking risks, but ultimately losing support at home and abroad. CMG